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CORPORATE SELF-REGULATION:
POLITICAL ECONOMY, STATE REGULATION AND REFLEXIVE LABOUR LAW
Harry Arthurs *
Introduction

In his introductory essay, Brian Bercusson notes:

Actors at disparate levels ... are linking up to form novel regulatory approaches
... The efficacy of these emerging forms of labour regulation, their democratic
legitimacy, the goals and values underlying them, and the direction of reform are
all in dispute. 1
The ambition of this chapter is to explore one such “novel regulatory approach” –
reflexive labour law – and to assess not only its efficacy, legitimacy and normative
aspirations, but also its intellectual origins, assumptions and implications.

The growing corpus of reflexive labour law scholarship comprises foundational essays
by Gunther Teubner, 2 an extensive body of work by Drs. Rolf Rogowski and Ton

*
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Amsterdam, my hosts at a conference on Reflexive Labour Law in 2001, where I presented an earlier
version of this essay.
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See e.g. G. Teubner, “The Transformation of Law in the Welfare State” and “After Legal
Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post-regulatory Law” in G. Teubner (ed.) Dilemmas of Law in the
Welfare State (Berlin/NY: DeGruyter, 1985); “Industrial Democracy Through Law” in T. Daintith and G.
Teubner “Contract and Organization: Legal Analysis in the Light of Economic and Social Theory”
(Berlin/NY: DeGruyter, 1986); Juridification of Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis in the Areas of
Labor, Corporate, Antitrust and Social Welfare Law (Berlin/NY: DeGruyter, 1987); State, Law and
Economy as Autopoietic Systems: Regulation and Autonomy in a New Perspective (Milan: Giuffrė, 1992)
(with Alberto Febbrajo); Law as an Autopoietic System (London: Blackwells, 1993).

2
Wilthagen as well as several volumes edited by them, 3 and a number of books and
articles which engage with their work and Teubner’s. 4

While reflexive law belongs to a family of post-modern socio-legal theories which
dispute the state’s centrality in the administration of law’s empire, it is distinguished
by several controversial features: its claim that legal and other social systems are
closed and autonomous; its demarcation of system boundaries on the basis of
functional differentiation rather than stipulated or a priori characteristics; its identification
of legal discourse as the trigger for a binary distinction between law and non-law; its

3

Their English-language publications include: R. Rogowski and T. Wilthagen, “Reflexive Labour
Law: An Introduction” in R. Rogowski and T. Wilthagen (eds) Reflexive Labour Law: Studies in Industrial
Relations and Employment Regulation (Deventer/Boston: Kluwer, 1994); M. Aalders and T. Wilthagen,
“Moving Beyond Command-and-Control: Reflexivity in the Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health
and the Environment” (1997) 19 Law and Policy 415; R. Rogowski, “Autopoietic Industrial Relations and
Reflexive Labour Law” in T. Wilhagen (ed.) Advancing Theory in Labour Law and Industrial Relations in a
Global Context (Amsterdam: North-Holland Press, 1998); R .Rogowski, “Industrial Relations as a Social
System” (2000) 7 German Journal of Industrial Relations 97; R. Rogowski, “The Concept of Reflexive
Labour Law: Its Theoretical Background and Possible Applications” in J. Priban and D. Nelken, Law’s
New Boundaries: The consequences of legal Autopoiesis (Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartnouth, 2001).
4

See e.g. C. Barnard, S. Deakin, R. Hobbs, (2005) 'Reflexive law, corporate social responsibility
and the evolution of labour standards: the case of working time', in O. De Schutter, and S. Deakin. (eds.)
Social Rights and Market Forces: Is Open Coordination the Future for European Employment and Social
Policy? (Brussels: Bruylant, forthcoming) [available at: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp294.pdf]; J. Cohen
Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm (Princeton U. Press, 2002); H. Collins “Is there a Third Way
in Labour Law?” in A. Giddens (ed), The Global Third Way Debate (Blackwell Pub., 2001) 300; D.
Doorey, “Who Made That? Influencing Foreign Labour Practices Through Reflexive Domestic Disclosure
Regulation” (2006), 44(1) Osgoode Hall L.J. [forthcoming]; O. Lobel, “The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought” (2004) 89 Minn. L.R. 262 esp at
328 – 343; D. O’Rourke “Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor
Standards and Monitoring” (2003) 31 Policy Studies J. 1; S. Smisman, “Reflexive Law in Support of
Directly Deliberative Polyarchy: Reflexive-Deliberative Polyarchy as a Normative Frame for the OMC” in
O. De Schutter & S. Deakin (eds.), Social Rights and Market Forces: Is the Open Coordination of
Employment and Social Policies the Future of Social Europe? (Brussels, Bruylant) [forthcoming].
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insistence on the autopoietic - self-referential, self-regulating and self-reproducing character of law; and its novel hypothesis that law acts not so much by imposing itself
on other social domains directly as by regulating their self-regulatory processes as well
as its own. 5

I will explore some of these ideas in greater detail below. First, however, I will sketch
out three case studies of self-regulation in the labour sphere which will hopefully bring
into focus these features of reflexive law. Next, I will consider reflexive labour law from
the perspective of legal theory and political economy, with particular emphasis on the
marginalization of the state in both domains. And finally, I will explore the possibility
that the normative implications of reflexive labour law may turn out to be even more
important than its descriptive insights

Three case studies

Case study no. 1 - Voluntary codes of conduct 6

5

See generally N. Luhmann, Essays on Self-Reference (New York, Columbia University Press,
1990); G. Teubner (ed.) Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin/New York: Walter
de Gruyter, 1988); J. Priban and D. Nelken (eds.), Law’s New Boundaries supra note 3. For a root-andbranch critique see A. Beck, “Is Law an Autopoietic System?” (1994) 14 Oxford J. of Legal Studies 401.
6

For a fuller development of these ideas, and more extensive references, see H.W. Arthurs,
“Private Ordering and Workers’ Rights in the Global Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime
of Labour Market Regulation” in J. Conaghan, K.Klare, M. Fischl (eds.) Labour Law in an Era of
Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and
“Corporate Codes of Conduct: Profit, Power and Law in the Global Economy” in W. Cragg (ed.) Ethics
Codes, Corporations and the Challenges of Globalization (Edward Elgar Press, 2005).
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As has been widely remarked, many global corporations have recently adopted
voluntary codes of conduct. Labour standards feature frequently in these codes, which
also often encompass environmental practices, commercial honesty, consumer
protection and integrity in dealings with government officials. What does this sudden
upsurge in the use of voluntary codes signify? Opinions vary: codes represent the
principled acceptance by corporations of their social obligations; they are a fig leaf used
to conceal corporate exploitation; they fill a regulatory gap caused by the inability of
states to regulate the actions of corporations outside their own boundaries; they signal
an innovative shift in the modalities of market regulation from a pure state-based
command model to new hybrid models involving a mix of public and private initiatives;
they are a concession wrung from governments and corporations as a result of
pressures generated by political and social actors concerned about exploitation and
abuse; and - perhaps - they are evidence of the existence of autopoietic systems and of
the ubiquity of reflexive law.

The use of the term “voluntary” to describe these codes requires some explanation.
They are typically adopted without compulsion of law; thus in a juridical sense they are
indeed voluntary. But in a practical sense, they are generally less so. They are often
adopted only after a corporation has been accused of exploiting or abusing its workers,
either at home or abroad. Adverse publicity ensues, and the corporation is confronted
by threats of moral, economic or political sanctions such as consumer boycotts,
sympathetic industrial action, denial of government loans and procurement contracts, or

5
(infrequently) legislation barring its goods from market. If these threats are deemed
credible, the corporation must respond. One response is to adopt a “code” which
declares its commitment to respect fundamental labour rights such as freedom of
association, a safe work environment and the absence of coercion and discrimination.
In a variant of this scenario, corporations which are not themselves the immediate target
of censure or pressure, but are potentially vulnerable to it, may proactively adopt a code
developed by a sectoral organization, an international agency, a national government,
or their professional advisors. Or they may adopt a code entirely on their own initiative,
in an effort to secure whatever market or moral rewards accrue to exemplars of
corporate social responsibility. In a final variant, corporations may be drawn into
collaboration with NGOs in drafting, administering and even monitoring a code. 7 To
reiterate: in these scenarios, codes are “voluntary” in the sense that corporations do not
adopt them under compulsion of state law. But of course they are also “non-voluntary”,
in the sense that they are adopted out of fear of sanctions or hope of reward.

Whether voluntary or not, however, corporate codes are indisputably “corporate”. That

7

For an overview of codes and their contents see K. Gordon and M. Miyake, Deciphering Codes of
Corporate Conduct: A Review of their Contents Paris: OECD, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and
Enterprise Affairs, Working Papers on International Investment No. 99/2 (1999); Report of the Working
Party of the Trade Committee of the Trade Directorate, Codes of Corporate Conduct - An Inventory,
Paris: OECD TD/TCWP(98)74, 1999. For a discussion of labour codes in particular, see United Nations
Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 1994 - Transnational
Corporations, Employment and the Workplace (New York/Geneva: United Nations, 1994) at 349 ff.; ILO,
Overview of Global Developments (Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of Trade,
Report to the International Labour Office Nov. 1998) GB.273/WP/SDL/1 found at www.ilo.org.ch/public/
english/20gb/ docs/ gb273/sdl-1.htm; J. Diller “A Social Conscience in the Marketplace? Labour
Dimensions of Codes of Conduct, Social Labelling and Investor Initiatives” (1999) 138 International
Labour Review 99.
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is to say, their drafting, administration and enforcement reflect the fact that they
originate in the realm of private, rather than public, regulation. 8 This shapes their
architecture in several important ways. First, their substantive provisions are typically
vaguely worded, perhaps to allow for their application in diverse economic, sociocultural and legal contexts; as a result, it is difficult to identify clear violations. Second,
responsibility for code administration is seldom fixed on any specific corporate officer,
nor are procedures mandated whereby adherence is promoted or compliance
monitored; as a result, corporations often fail to publicize codes internally, train their
employees to respect them, clarify vague language through information bulletins, or
report on overall code compliance to their boards of directors. 9 Third, sanctions for noncompliance are seldom specified, nor is machinery established whereby sanctions can
be imposed on non-complying employees, subsidiaries, suppliers or affiliates. Given
these characteristics, codes often appear to be - and are - ineffectual, if not actually
counter-productive. 10 This is obviously not to suggest that all corporations with codes

8

See generally M. Priest, “The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation” (1997)
29 Ottawa Law Review 233; N. Gunningham and J. Rees, “Industrial Self-Regulation: An Institutional
Perspective” (1997) 19 Law and Policy 364.
9

A recent survey of major Canadian companies doing business abroad discloses that over 85%
professed to have a written document dealing with corporate ethics relating to labour, environmental and
business practices, including about 50% which described such statements as “rules of conduct” or
“guidelines”. However, over 60% did not train their staff to administer such documents; virtually all those
which did spent 4 hours per year or less on such training; that only 15-25% of such companies applied
any aspect of their ethics codes to suppliers; only 2-12% reported to their Boards of Directors on
compliance; and similarly low rates of Board oversight were exercised even with regard to the firms’ own
practices. Bribery stands apart as receiving somewhat more intensive and extensive scrutiny. KPMG,
Ethics Survey 2000 - Managing for Ethical Practice http://www.kpmg.ca/english/services/docs/ fas/
ethicssurvey2000e.pdf.

10

A. King and M. Lenox, “Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry’s
Responsible Care Program” (2000) 4 Academy of Management Journal 698.
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are guilty of egregious behaviour: only that codes per se do not seem to not seem to be
an efficient or contributing cause of higher labour standards. 11

However, reflexive law makes us sensitive to the possibility that the very appearance of
a code may be evidence of a pattern of adaptive behaviour, of a learning process which
over time will reshape the law of the corporation and its workplaces. Indeed, while I
have accurately described the first generation of corporate codes, I believe, a second
generation of codes is said to be emerging. This second generation is characterized by
several innovations, designed to give greater credibility to codes, if not actually to
enhance their effectiveness. First, transnational advocacy organizations - unions and
social movements - are claiming a greater role in the formulation and administration of
codes. Second, the monitoring or auditing of code compliance has become a discrete
and increasingly professionalized function, often contracted out to specialist commercial
or non-profit agencies which operate at arm’s length from the corporation itself. Third,
in a few cases, senior management and boards of directors are becoming more heavily
invested in the exercise: responsibilities are fixed on a compliance officer and the code
itself becomes a standing item on the directors’ agenda. Fourth, proactive steps are
11

Of course, this is an empirical question in each case, and therefore likely to involve controversial
issues of evidence interpretation. For a rather poignant example of such a controversy, contrast the
honestly optimistic view of the chair of the Independent Monitoring Council responsible for ensuring
implementation of Mattel Inc.’s “Global Manufacturing Principles” with the critical comments of the
representative of an independent monitoring group (Asia Monitor Resource Centre) concerning noncompliance with those principles in Mattel factories in Thailand. See S. P. Sethi, “Corporate
Accountability through International Codes of Conduct - Theoretical Implications and Challenges to
Cross-Cultural Applications: The Case of Mattel, Inc.” (Sao Paolo: Second World Congress, International
Society of Business, Economics and Ethics - ‘The Ethical Challenges of Globalization’, July, 2000,
unpublished) and S. Frost “Factory Rules versus Codes of Conduct: Which Option makes Sense for
Business?” (2000) 2:4 Human Rights Dialogue 3 (Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs).
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being taken to ensure that suppliers and other elements in the production chain do not
embarrass the company by violating code standards. Fifth, less frequently, the
language of the code is re-written to provide more explicit guarantees of a broader
range of employment standards, occasionally even including a “living wage” or a “fair
wage”. And finally, sanctions are built into some code regimes in the form of
compliance marks or labels whose presence or absence will trigger positive or negative
consumer reactions.

It is too early to assess what practical consequences - if any - might flow from these
second generation corporate codes. However, a third generation may be just over the
horizon. One distinguishing feature of third generation voluntary corporate codes would
be that they cease to be purely “corporate”; states and civil society actors would be
equal partners or even prime movers in their drafting, promulgation, administration and
enforcement. 12 The other is that they would no longer be purely “voluntary”; they would
be mandated and enforced by law. Legislation has been proposed in both the United
States and Australia which would require that all corporations doing business abroad
adopt a code, ensure its transparent administration, and be subject to sanctions for noncompliance in the form of loss of access to government export loan guarantees,

12

R. O’Brien, “NGOs, Global Civil Society and Global Economic Regulation” and R. Mayne,
“Regulating TNCs: The Role of Voluntary and Governmental Approaches” in Picciotto and R. Mayne,
Regulating International Business - Beyond Liberalization (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); K.
Gordon, “Rules for the Global Economy: Synergies between Voluntary and Binding Approaches”
Unpublished paper, Conference on Corporate Citizenship: Linking CSR business strategies and the
emerging international agenda (London, 8-9 November, 1999).
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procurement contracts and other forms of government support. 13 And several legal
scholars and advocates have suggested that corporate codes might be used by courts
as evidentiary or normative standards designed to establish, diminish or eliminate
corporate civil or criminal liability for wrongful conduct, even though the codes
themselves are not directly enforceable as such. 14 But so far, neither legal approach
has made much headway.

If indeed a third generation of codes does emerge, with the imprimatur of state law and
the involvement of civil society and state - as well as corporate - actors, this would
represent a genuine innovation. It would also constitute a convenient site for empirical
investigation of the hypothesis that regulatory efficacy will increase as successive
generations of codes move up a rising gradient of state involvement. But we may not
be able to investigate this hypothesis for some time yet. State-mandated codes so far
remain below the horizon and, for reasons canvassed in a subsequent section of this

13

In the United States, see the Corporate Code of Conduct Act, HR 4596 IH (Rep. McKinney)
introduced June 7, 2000. Complying corporations would receive preferential treatment in the awarding of
federal contracts, participation in trade and development programs and access to export-import credits
and loan guarantees. In Australia, a similar Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000 was introduced by
Senator Vicki Bourne as a private member’s bill. See
http://search.aph.gov.au/search/parlinfo.ASP?action=browse&Path=legislation/. Neither is likely to be
enacted in the foreseeable future.
14

See e.g. for international law perspectives: N. Horn, Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for
Multinational Enterprises (Deventer: Kluwer, 1980). And for domestic perspectives: see e.g. H.L. Pitt & G.
Groskuafmanis, “Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of
Conduct” (1990) 78 Georgetown Law Journal 1559; C.J. Walsh & A. Pyrich, “Corporate Compliance
Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul” (1995) 47 Rutgers Law
Review 605 Winter 1995; K. Webb, “Voluntary Approaches, the Environment and the Law: A Canadian
Perspective” in C. Carraro and F. Lévéque (eds.) Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy
(Deventer: Kluwer, 1999); S. Lu, “Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human Rights
Through Deceptive Advertising Law” (2000) 38 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 603.
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chapter, they are unlikely to surface soon. Codes, therefore, remain no more than a
potentially interesting example of how reflexivity and change may occur in a closed
normative system.

Case study no. 2 - Ratcheting Labour Standards
An important recent academic article has proposed that leading corporations should
commit themselves to “ratcheting labour standards” permanently upward. The essence
of this “RLS” proposal is to create a system for
... monitoring and public disclosure of working conditions [which would] ... create
official, social and financial incentives for firms to monitor and improve their own
factories and those of their suppliers.

This would be accomplished by creating
... an easily accessible pool of information with which the best practices of
leading firms could be publicly identified, compared and diffused to others in
comparable settings....The combination of firm-level monitoring and an
infrastructure for pooling results would help to set provisional minimum standards
of corporate behaviour, upon which competition - driven by social and regulatory
pressures - would generate improvements that then “ratchet” standards
upwards. 15
The key features of the RLS proposal - transparency, competition, continuous
improvement and sanctions (“social and regulatory pressures”) - mark it as worthy of
attention from students of reflexive labour law. However, it has already received
attention - unflattering attention - from labour and academic commentators, who have
15

A. Fung, D. O’Rourke & C. Sabel, “Realizing Labor Standards” (2001) http://bostonreview.
mit.edu / BR26.1/fung.html; see also C. Sabel et al “Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for
Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace” (2000) http://www.law.columbia.edu/
sabel/papers/ratchPO.html.
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dubbed it “wishful thinking”. 16 As one such commentator has noted, there is little
empirical evidence that RLS will in fact produce the desired results:
...of 61 factories “certified” by SA8000 [a standard such as those proposed by the
authors of RLS], 34 of them are in China. In the SA8000 code there is very
strong language about freedom of association. If any workers in those 34
factories were to try and exercise the rights spelled out in the code, they would
find themselves in jail or an insane asylum. 17
At the very least, then, RLS raises in different form issues similar to those posed by the
“third wave” of voluntary codes: what is the relationship between self-regulation and
state regulation? to what extent is it possible to think about RLS in isolation from the
political economy and legal system of each state in which this approach is to operate?
For example, if states tolerate or even insist upon a low level of workers’ rights, how
likely are corporations operating there to adhere to a higher standard even when
formally committed to RLS? And, conversely, if states insist on decent labour
standards, what need is there for RLS? 18

The RLS proposal itself is less than clear on these questions. Its proponents insist that
RLS “...aims not to deregulate, but rather to redeploy public power in ways that extend

16

M. Levinson, “Wishful Thinking” http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR26.1/levinson.html. Cf. J. Murray,
“The Sound of One Hand Clapping? The ‘Ratcheting Labour Standards’ Proposal and International
Labour Law” (2001), 14 Aust. J. Labour L. 306
17
Levinson, supra note 16.
18
A less polemical, recent empirical study of codes operating in four Chinese footwear factories
which supply footwear to US-based transnational corporations concluded: “the absence of de facto
supporting institutions and norms at the national and local level in China militated against workers’
awareness and support for workers’ rights, as enshrined in labour legislation and the codes of practice.
For the codes to be effective ... institutional supports in the form of labour law enforcement, some kind of
legitimate, independent workers’ institution, and procedures for skill enhancement, will be necessary....”
S. Frenkel, “Globalization, Athletic Footwear Commodity Chains and Employment Relations in Southern
China” (2001) 22 Organizational Studies 531 at 558.
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its regulatory reach and wisdom”, that it is not “a concession to unfettered markets” but
rather that it will “strengthen the hands and extend the horizons of those who have long
championed workplace improvements”. 19 However, state action is clearly not an
intrinsic feature of RLS. On the one hand, RLS rests on the fundamental assumption
that conventional regulation by the state has proved incapable of achieving its
objectives, and that it must be replaced or supplemented by new regulatory strategies
which are more compatible with the political economy of globalization. For that reason,
the design of RLS begins not with state initiatives or in state institutions but with private
initiatives and in the corporate context. On the other hand, RLS proponents do make
passing reference to “a more ambitious” model of their project. In this more ambitious
model, they suggest, states might enact legislation requiring domestic firms to
participate in RLS, might promulgate performance standards and benchmarks
generated by RLS procedures as their own official labour standards, might “transform
their own regulatory systems from fixed-rule to ratcheting by requiring domestic firms to
score high on RLS measures or face sanctions,” and might (one can infer) impose
sanctions which are of a “regulatory” as well as a “social” character. 20

In short, even in the eyes of its proponents, for RLS to become “more ambitious”, it
must become more state-centred. But here there is a potential contradiction: state law,
state institutions, state policies may endanger reflexivity. This may happen in several
19

Fung et al, supra, note 15 at p. 17.

20

Ibid at pp. 17-18.
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ways. State policies may force social actors such as corporations to abandon their
efforts to ratchet labour standards upwards, as in the Chinese example cited above.
State regulatory institutions in countries with politically accountable legislatures may
brush aside corporate regimes of self-regulation which are deemed unambitious,
insincere or inefficacious. Or state law may encumber reflexive systems with
constitutional, procedural and substantive requirements - formal promulgation, clear
definitions of conduct, predictable sanctions - which are inconsistent with their implicit,
allusive and inchoate character.

Case study no. 3 - The United Nations Global Compact
Self-regulation has perhaps reached its apotheosis in the Global Compact signed by the
Secretary General of the United Nations, more than fifty of the world’s most powerful
corporations and a number of unions and social movements. 21 Like the RLS proposal,
the UN Global Compact displays some characteristics of reflexive law. It is driven by
the techno-professional discourse of a dialogic community; it is a closed system capable
of receiving and responding to external stimuli; its success depends on the willingness
of participants to engage in a transparent exchange of opinions and information; and is
designed to regulate not conduct per se but other normative systems, especially those
embedded in corporate relationships.

The Global Compact declares nine substantive principles - two concerned with human
21

See http://www.unglobalcompact.org.

14
rights, four with the environment and four with labour standards. 22 It commits
signatories to advocate the principles of the Compact to both internal and external
audiences; to “embrace, support and enact” these principles “within their sphere of
influence”; to submit once each year “a concrete example of progress made or a lesson
learned in implementing the principles”; to promote positive behaviour by their own
employees; to participate in an exchange of information with other companies; and to
enter into a dialogue with their social partners concerning further measures. 23

Finally, the Compact initiates various processes - a learning forum, policy dialogues,
company and partnership initiatives and outreach - through which it seeks to promote
the dissemination of best practices, to encourage their adoption by subscribing
corporations, and to foster cooperation amongst corporations, governments, unions and
civil society. 24

On its face, the UN Global Compact seems at worst innocuous, and at best a modest
step towards promoting global corporate accountability. Indeed, it is likely the most
amibitious initiative that the Secretary General could hope to undertake, given the
adamant refusal of many states to accept any measures which might compromise their

22

Freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining (principle 3);
elimination of forced and compulsory labour (principle 4); effective abolition of child labour (principle 5);
and elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation (principle 6).
23

Global Compact, supra note 21.

24

Ibid.
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sovereignty or their competitive edge. 25 However, some civil society actors have been
critical of the Compact from its inception, claiming that corporations have become
“tangled up in blue” - accorded recognition and prestige through their association with
the Secretary General and the UN itself. These critics argue, for example, that
membership of the Global Compact should not have been extended to corporations
which have been guilty of egregious abuses of workers, human rights or the
environment; that the relationship of such corporations to the UN and civil society actors
should not be described as a “partnership”; that the image of the UN has been sullied by
its deferential attitude towards these corporations; and that the Compact establishes no
monitoring or enforcement procedures. 26

As the Compact was signed only in mid-2000, and is not yet fully operational, it is
impossible to evaluate its positive or negative impact. 27 However, it does constitute a
highly visible experiment whose results will contribute to a better understanding of the
potential and the limits of self-regulation and reflexive labour law.

25

The inability of the UN - for over 35 years - to agree upon even a non-binding code of conduct for
multinational corporations is some evidence of the difficulties which confronts such measures. See D.
Kinley, “Human Rights as Legally Binding or Merely Relevant?” in S. Bottomley and D. Kinley (eds.)
Commercial Law and Human Rights (Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2001). For an account of other
difficulties precluding more conventional strategies, see J. Ruggie, “Global_governance.net: The Global
Compact as a Learning Network” (2001) 7 Global Governance 371. Ruggie was one of the architects of
the Global Compact.
26

See Transnational Resource and Action Center (TRAC), Tangled up in Blue: Corporate
Partnerships at the United Nations. http://corpwatch.org/trac/globalization/un/tangled.html (Sept 6, 2000).
27

The early literature - a Symposium on the Global Compact in (2001) 34 Cornell International Law
Journal
is perforce largely descriptive and speculative. For a guardedly optimistic view of the Global
Compact from the perspective of critical legal pluralism, see A. Blackett, “Global Goverance, Legal
Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct”(2001) 8
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The significance of self-regulation: several observations in search of an
hypothesis

These brief sketches of experiments in corporate self-regulation suggest that reflexive
labour law may be becoming more commonplace, that it may indeed emerge as the
characteristic legal form of the future. 28 This makes it especially important to explore
why self-regulation and reflexive labour law seem so relevant at this particular moment
in history. Note first that many of the post-modern socio-legal theories 29 which have
emerged in recent decades display characteristics associated as well with reflexive law.
(They also exhibit fundamental differences, reflecting the diversity of intellectual
provenances and socio-political milieux in which they first appeared.) 30 These theories
in general challenge the conventional “command model” of law; emphasize the
normative fecundity of social fields; insist on the pluralistic character of legal systems;
acknowledge the role in law-making, -interpreting and -enforcing of discursive
communities and other agents not formally mandated by the state; and regard the close
alignment of state and law as an historical contingency of the modern era. In various

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 401 at 440 ff.
28

W. Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time (Baltimore/London:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004) at 210 ff.
29
This includes work on jural polycentricity or legal pluralism; Bourdieu’s emphasis on the
constitution of the “legal field”, studies by Burawoy and Stuart Henry on workplace normativity; the
governance school which derives from the work of Foucauld; analyses of the emergence of “soft law”,
especially in transnational relationships; and elements of critical legal studies. For references to this work
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ways, then, they share an attitude of scepticism about the state’s central role in the
meta-narrative of law.

And now a second observation. The de-centering of the state is not only an important
issue for socio-legal scholars. It is the defining issue of political life in most countries.
The notion that the state should intervene actively to promote the public interest and
distribute public goods has been the subject of relentless, often irrational and
sometimes cogent criticism for almost as long as activist government has been
advocated and practised. However, especially since the Thatcher and Reagan
administrations of the 1980s, this criticism has become particularly strident in the
English-speaking world. It has produced disenchantment with the state, and apathy even hostility - towards electoral politics not least, ironically, amongst marginalized
groups which are the principal clients of state intervention and amongst the political and
technocratic elites which have been shaping state policy and directing state
administration.

Disenchantment, hostility and apathy have transformed the discourse of labour law. It is
no longer a given that the state can or should ensure minimum labour standards,
promote countervailing power, redistribute wealth or coordinate corporatist strategies
which feature labour as a prominent contributor and principal beneficiary. Instead, the
state is now to be assigned the more mundane tasks of providing infrastructure,

Autopoietic Law – A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin/NY: de Gruyter, 1988).
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supporting human resource development, blaming refugees and immigrants for labour
market dislocations caused by structural adjustment to technology and globalization,
and imposing economic and legal discipline on assertive workers. Likewise, the key
participants in the formation of labour policy have changed. Labour lawyers (now
“employment lawyers”), industrial relations managers (now “human resources” officers),
trade unionists (still “trade unionists”, but fewer in number) and labour ministries (where
they still exist) no longer play key roles, if any; economists, corporate lobbyists, central
bankers, Treasury officials and Ministries of Trade and Industry now control the agenda.
31

And that agenda itself has changed, both for policy makers and scholars.

Considerable anti-labour legislation has been enacted by neo-liberal, centrist and social
democratic governments around the world; progressive reforms are at best a remote
possibility in most countries; 32 and in many benign neglect is the most labour can hope
for. In much of North America (though perhaps not in Europe) 33 the intense and highly
politicized debates over workers’ rights which once raged within academic labour law
have been largely superseded by yet more intense and highly politicized controversies
over gender, race and disability; 34 and within the residual domain of labour law,
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individual employment law - for practical reasons, the law of privileged categories of
workers - attracts more attention than collective labour law.

In short, the de-centering of the state has altered power relations. Most states are now
unwilling or unable to confront powerful global corporations, which can dis-invest with
relative ease, which can relocate production to more business-friendly jurisdictions, and
which can destabilize share prices and national currencies. In fact, in most states, the
shift of political power away from labour is accepted, however glumly, as a fact of life.
Governments confront only sporadic protests against the loss of labour’s entitlements,
only plaintive pleas for protection against the dislocations which result from the “creative
destruction” of global capitalism. Even the traumatic anti-globalization protests in
Seattle, Prague, Genoa, Quebec and elsewhere have not so far produced organized,
sustained, mass support for laws and policies which protect workers. For all of these
reasons, workers - even those who populate the thinning ranks of unions - are reluctant
to challenge their employers. This, I suggest, is the context within which we must
understand the recent proliferation of experiments in corporate self-regulation.

The political economy of a reflexive labour law system: voluntary codes as a test
case

Against this background, one may ask: if socio-legal theory and political economy are
being transformed in the same moment, in the same direction, does one have
something to do with the other, and if not, what does their coincidental convergence

20
imply for an understanding of reflexive labour law?

In an important recent piece, Rogowski argues that “... a major function of reflexive law
is to stimulate and instigate self-reflection and self-regulation in other social
systems..... 35 Taking the three episodes of self-regulation described above as
examples of reflexive labour law operating in this way, we can next explore what
Rogowski describes as his “research hypotheses”, as trends which he detects in the
regulation of labour and employment conflicts:

*

the emergence of increasingly specialized and autonomous labour
tribunals, which become the primary locus of innovation in the labour law
system

*

enhanced proceduralisation of labour law, in part reflecting a growing
disenchantment with instrumentalism, formalization and materialization

*

self-regulation leading to mutual recognition amongst the multiple systems
of social ordering which impinge on the workplace, with a view to
facilitating their autonomy and self-reproduction and with a commensurate
decline in judicial regulation. 36

Rogowski does not suggest, of course, that these are the only possible manifestations
35
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of reflexivity in labour law whether in its conflictual or non-conflictual aspects. Nor does
he have much to say specifically about corporate codes or other forms of corporate selfregulation. Nonetheless, the three case studies summarized above - of corporate
codes, of RLS and of the UN Global Compact - generally do support Rogowski’s
“research hypotheses”. However, in each case one must enter a serious caveat.

It is true that voluntary code-based systems are totally or largely “autonomous”, that
they are closed systems and that tribunals associated with them - though rare - are
indeed highly specialized. But there is little evidence that code-based systems actually
produce innovation, except to the extent that by masking or cosmeticizing the decline of
state labour law they help to facilitate and normalize the shift of power from unions and
workers to employers.

As Rogowski predicts, these new regimes of corporate self-regulation - unlike state law
- are often neither rational nor instrumental nor formal in their operation and effects.
Their mandates tend to be expressed only in vague and modest aspirational terms; their
capacity to initiate action or pursue complaints is circumscribed; their remedial powers
are negligible or non-existent; their professional character is typically underdeveloped;
their activity levels are low; and their capacity or ambition to actually shape the conduct
of the corporations which promulgate them appear to be minimal. Consequently, as
near as anyone can tell, they have produced little change in the workplace. 37

37

In fairness, while claims and counter-claims abound concerning the efficacy or inefficacy of self-
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To compensate, as Rogowski points out, these regimes are often heavily
“proceduralized”, in the sense that they seek to achieve their objectives by emphasizing
transparency, the promotion of cooperation and the dissemination of best practices.
Their proceduralism is fraught with great symbolic significance. Performances of the
rituals of self-regulation - the well-publicized adoption of a code, for example, or the
blessing conferred on the exercise by senior government officials, the undertaking of
annual compliance audits, the occasional solemn exorcism of an offending contractor,
the publication of self-congratulatory reports - tell us a great deal about the values and
interests which shape labour market regulation today. 38 They remind us that states and
their voters seem content that corporations should create and administer their own
standards, that they should be trusted and admired for their conscientious behaviour,
and that while workers should benefit from such behaviour, they should play no role in
shaping or censuring it. And they remind us, as well, that to the extent that reflexivity is
accomplished by such symbolic strategies, we must ask ourselves what are its
prospects for improving on the outcomes achieved by more conventional regulatory
regimes.

regulatory regimes, the literature does not provide much empirical evidence one way or the other. The
most sophisticated empirical study to date, however, concludes that companies which have subscribed to
an code of self-regulation in the US Chemical Industry have a worse environmental record than those
which did not. See A. King and M. Lenox, supra note 10.
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Rogowski hypothesizes that workplaces are increasingly regulated by multiple regimes including “company procedures and other mechanisms of self-regulation” - which
contribute to legal complexity, and ultimately to the “juridification of social regulations”. 39
Because these multiple regimes interact with but do not control each other, he
suggests, state courts tend to concentrate on the necessary task of resolving conflicts
amongst them rather than regulating employers and workers directly. A reasonable
hypothesis: but what does it imply?

On the one hand, courts may use state laws of general application or broad concepts
such as “jurisdiction” to mediate inter-systemic conflicts by limiting the autonomy of one
system or enlarging that of another. In given circumstances, this may protect workers’
rights and limit corporate power. Or courts may use concepts such as “due process” or
“reasonableness” to ensure that all systems - state or private - conform to minimal
standards of fairness. Again, in given circumstances, workers may be the beneficiaries.
However, even such well-meant curial mediation may undermine or over-burden the
fragile procedures, doctrines and discourses of reflexive workplace systems and render
them incapable of performing the protective functions for which they were originally
designed. 40 On the other hand, when courts decide to simply take a hands-off attitude
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to reflexive regimes, the result can also be prejudicial to workers. 41 Everything depends
on the nature of the systems in question.

Likewise, courts may decide to attempt to resolve inter-systemic conflicts not by
adjusting reflexive workplace regimes to conform to the mediating principles of state
law, but rather by mobilizing the power of state law to reinforce the values and
assumptions of those reflexive regimes. For example, as noted earlier, courts might
decide to hold corporations liable under state criminal, tort, contract or regulatory law for
violations of their own codes of conduct. 42 Or they might actually mandate the creation
of new reflexive systems of self-regulation, which would operate under court auspices
on an ongoing basis, 43 much as legislatures did in encouraging or requiring the
practice of grievance arbitration in North America. Again, in terms of the consequences
for workers, everything depends on the quality of those systems.

41
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It seems clear, then, that Rogowski is right in his fundamental insight that the existence
of normative pluralism raises issues of legal complexity and internormativity which in
turn invite mediation by state courts. But it is now important to add that there is no
single set of appropriate organizing principles which must inform such mediation, that
there is no way of predicting whether mediation will work in favour of particularistic,
indigenous or reflexive law rather than in favour of state laws of general application, and
that there is no necessary assurance that the resulting social outcomes are likely to be
favour workers rather than employers.

From Rogowski’s perspective, systemic mediation is driven by a tendency towards the
reduction of legal complexity. However, as he acknowledges, the reduction of legal
complexity may amount in practice to deregulation of the labour market. This is clearly
a matter of concern to Rogowski who distinguishes “reflexive deregulation” of the
workplace from that driven by neo-liberal ideology. Indeed, Rogowski’s own preference
is for an approach which “ ... pursues not only economic but also wider social goals, ...
[which] tries to strike a balance between employer demands of reduced levels of
protection and the employees’ interests to find and keep a secure job”. 44 But this
formulation is important. It suggests that while proponents of the theory of theory of
reflexive law begin by stating that their aims are purely descriptive or analytical, they
themselves acknowledge that in practice reflexive labour law systems may produce
effects with real-life political, social or moral consequences which they regard as
44
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undesirable. I will return to this point in my conclusion.

Finally, as Rogowski remarks, reflexive systems are not only autonomous in their
operation; they have an extensive capacity for self-reproduction. 45 States have so far
generally not captured them; they proliferate; they mutate in successive generations;
and they maintain remarkable isolation from the adjacent state systems, whose
incursions they are designed to forestall. They operate, in other words, in much the
same way as lethal viruses and dangerous new drug-resistant strains of bacteria. Of
course, reflexive systems of labour law are not inherently lethal or dangerous to the
well-being of workers and the health of unions. But it is not irrelevant that the
proliferation of regimes of corporate self-regulation - of reflexive labour law regimes, in
other words - seems to have no necessary connection with an improvement in labour
standards for workers employed by corporations which have adopted codes of conduct,
committed themselves to “ratcheting” standards upwards through the sharing of best
practices, or signed on to the UN Global Compact.

Even more cynical interpretations are possible. Perhaps there is a connection between
reflexive labour law and enhanced labour standards. Reflexivity, after all, implies
learning. In the new labour law dispensation of corporate self-regulation, employees
are indeed learning: to accept that the state cannot or will not protect them; to applaud
employers whose adoption of voluntary codes certifies that they are responsible
45
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corporate citizens; to subject themselves willingly to governance by those codes and, by
extension, by the other normative systems promulgated by their employer; and
ultimately to abandon the notion that they can shape their own fate by supporting unions
or political parties committed to aggressive state regulation of the labour market.

Conclusion: beyond reflexivity, beyond labour law

The three sketches of corporate self-regulation which introduce this essay do not so
much challenge the hypotheses of reflexivity as expose their potential dark side.
However, one should not criticize theories of reflexivity for what they do not claim and
therefore do not accomplish. As noted, Rogoswki and Wilthagen maintain that the
theory of reflexivity is intended to be descriptive rather than prescriptive. 46 That is to
say, it is meant to help us better understand socio-legal phenomena, not to enlist
support for specific regulatory strategies or programs, much less for ultimate political or
social values. To that extent, I have been somewhat unfair in stressing that reflexive
labour law may express, legitimate and even reinforce corporate power. On the other
hand, for several reasons, it is important for reflexive labour lawyers to come to grips
with the issue of power more explicitly than they have done so far.

Rogowski aptly cites Hegel’s famous aphorism that “... philosophy [a]s the thought of
the world ... appears only at a time when actuality has gone through its formative
46
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process and attained its completed state .... [T]he owl of Minerva begins its flight only
with the onset of the dusk....”47 The idea of reflexivity, I wish to suggest, arrives at the
dusk of postwar optimism about the potential of electoral politics and the activist state,
about social democracy, about the emancipatory potential of collective workers action,
about law’s rationality and practical attainments. It would therefore be helpful if reflexive
labour law had more to say about the events which characterize this neo-liberal dusk,
and about what Minerva’s owl portends for relations of power in the workplace.

This shortcoming is no reason to resist reflexive labour law as a descriptive or
explanatory theory. Indeed, the crisis of theorization in industrial relations, in law
generally, and in labour law in particular amply justifies all attempts to develop new
scientific critiques and new theoretical perspectives. 48 Reflexive labour law clearly
responds to this crisis. However, let us revisit the context. Like other theories
associated with post-modernity, reflexive law assumes - but does not insist - that the
state and its legal system are historically contingent and increasingly irrelevant. Fair
enough: but note that theories of neo-liberalism and globalization also dismiss the state
and its legal system - or at least the social democratic state and transformative legal
strategies. Is this mere coincidence? Or is there a connection - consequential,
ideological or epistemological - between reflexive law and neo-liberalism?
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At the least, it seems that the postmodern view of the state and the reflexive analysis of
law may become self-fulfilling prophecies. Theories such as reflexivity are not
parthenogenic: they do not create themselves, write themselves, disseminate
themselves. They are produced by human intelligence and propagated by human
agents - by scholars like us. But scholars like us are also - inescapably - political
actors: we write books and articles and shape the thinking of students, lawyers and
judges; we advocate public policies and advise governments and civil society
organizations; we prepare legal opinions and draft legislation. My concern is that our
scientific work will - even against our intentions - come to affect our political work, so
that our descriptive hypotheses about how law works will become prescriptive. After all,
if we believe in autopoiesis, what can we say about legislation or right-based litigation or
other purely instrumental approaches to law? If we believe in legal reflexivity, how can
we be critical, much less cynical, about corporate self-regulation which, after all, is a
text-book example of the phenomenon? At some point, then, what we believe as
scholars is likely to impinge upon what we do as political actors. When it does, the
activist state is going to suffer the defection of some of its most influential and
knowledgeable supporters - a loss it can ill afford in this era of neo-liberal ascendancy.

Finally, in this scenario, it is not just the state and its legal system which are being
transformed by the simultaneously assault of neo-liberalism and post-modern
theorizing. The metaphoric death of the state is likely to have the same disconcerting
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effects on labour lawyers and scholars as the death of God had on theologians and
members of religious orders. In the end, some of us may cling mindlessly to the old
church; others may abandon labour law entirely; still others may embrace new
economic faiths, new political values, new scientific revelations or new legal rituals. Will
reflexive labour law rise to the challenge of this new era to provide us with a narrative of
workplace normativity which is not only helpful in a descriptive and explanatory sense,
but which provides a basis for evaluation and critique? And will those of us who
persevere with scholarship in the field be able to build again - with new insights, in new
historical circumstances - a new regime of state labour law which speaks social justice
to corporate power? Or does the very formulation of these questions mark me as
someone who has failed to grasp the fundamental insights of reflexive labour law?

Wilthagen note 3 at 21 ff.

